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Abstract
We consider message-efficient broadcast tolerating
Byzantine faults in a multi-hop wireless sensor network. As-
suming a grid network where all nodes have a communi-
cation range of r, and a single neighborhood contains at
most t dishonest and collision-capable (bad) nodes, each
with a message budget mf , we investigate the minimum
message budget m that each honest (good) node must have
in order to achieve reliable broadcast. We consider three
cases: (1) mf is known in advance and m is homogeneous
among all good nodes; (2) mf is known in advance and m
is heterogeneous among good nodes; (3) mf is unknown.
For the first two cases, we present possibility results and
broadcast protocols that have message costs within twice
the lower bound. For the third case, we present a coding
scheme that helps verify the integrity of messages at a re-
ceiving node without using any cryptographic techniques.
This code leads to a reactive local broadcast primitive that
has probabilistic reliability guarantees. Combined with a
previously proposed scheme, it results in a broadcast proto-
col for t < 12r(2r+ 1) that guarantees reliability with high
probability.
1 Introduction
In the design of sensor networks, the impact of mali-
cious behavior should be taken into account because the
sensor nodes are often deployed in unattended and phys-
ically insecure environments. The low cost configuration
of sensor nodes make traditional measures such as tamper-
proof hardware not cost effective, and even standard cryp-
tographic techniques may be too expensive for common de-
vices [12]. Under this constraint, many reliability/security
problems arise. In this paper we consider how to achieve
reliable broadcast in a message-efficient way in such a net-
work.
In the problem, referred to as BFT-BCAST, there is a
base station serving as message source. The task is to de-
∗Author names are in alphabetical order; correspondence may be ad-
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liver the correct message from the base station to all nodes
in the network via multi-hop links, despite some faulty or
malicious (called bad in this paper) nodes that may alter
the message or cause collisions. For low cost considera-
tion, it is desirable to accomplish the task assuming little or
even no cryptography (for example, when (re)establishing
keys). Assuming a non-collision and non-cryptography set-
ting, Koo [13] first studies this problem and shows the max-
imum number of bad nodes per neighborhood, t, that can be
tolerated by a broadcast protocol. In subsequent work [2,3],
Bhandari et al. further prove that Koo’s bound is a critical
threshold. In [14], Koo et al. remove the non-collision as-
sumption and show that the maximum tolerable t in a colli-
sion network remains the same as in a non-collision setting,
provided that the bad nodes are collision-bounded.
We study a similar problem to that of [2, 13, 14], with
an emphasis on message efficiency, an important system
property that has not been considered previously. We as-
sume that every node, either good or bad, has a total bound
on the number of messages it can send. This tries to cap-
ture the fact that many network devices (for example the
Smart Dust sensors [11]) are extremely constrained in en-
ergy, thus a finite message budget for a node to perform a
task or an attack is a realistic assumption. This assumption
differs from the one made by Koo et al. [14] which assumes
that a bad node is bounded only in the number of collisions
it can cause, but not bounded otherwise. The latter condi-
tion actually allows a simple treatment of collisions: if a bad
node can cause at most β collisions, then a good node can
simulate a collision-free transmission by repeatedly sending
every message βt + 1 times. However, it is unclear what
will happen if a good node’s budget is lower than βt+1, or
whether this βt+ 1 budget is necessary at all.
Our aim is to answer the following question: Given the
message budget of every bad node mf ∈ N and the maxi-
mum number of bad nodes per neighborhood, t, what is the
minimum message budget each good node must have for
BFT-BCAST to be possible, and if possible, how to achieve
that? We show that, when mf is known in advance, then
the task can be achieved with a message cost within twice
the lower bound, and allowing heterogeneous assignment of
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message budgets can further reduce average message cost.
We also present a probabilistic solution for the case of un-
known mf .
Without assuming cryptographic mechanisms, the gen-
eral approach for a broadcast protocol to overcome Byzan-
tine faults is to send repetitive correct messages that out-
number potential false messages [2, 13, 14, 17]. To account
for various kinds of faults, such protocols are often mes-
sage costly, especially when the fraction of faulty nodes ap-
proaches the threshold. Therefore they are often envisioned
to be used in some key parts of, rather than for all, commu-
nication tasks, such as (re)establishing cryptographic keys
and sending message digests. Those parts of communica-
tion are particularly sensitive to failures, and thus deserve
special care. On the other hand, they are less demanding in
traffic, so a relatively heavy-weight protocol may be accept-
able. Considering the most general application scenarios
and also following the line of previous research, our proto-
cols do not use any cryptographic techniques.
1.1 Related work
Reliable broadcast has been well studied for both point-
to-point and radio networks. In [16], reliable broadcast in
an arbitrary graph is considered. Upper and lower bounds in
terms of graph theoretic parameters for the feasibility of re-
liable broadcast are presented, although no exact thresholds
are given. Pelc and Peleg [17] consider random transmis-
sion failures for both radio and message-passing networks,
where each node fails at each step with some constant
probability. They establish feasibility conditions and esti-
mate the complexity of almost-safe broadcasting for such a
model. One of their assumptions is that a node cannot send
different messages to different neighbors, which resembles
the characteristics of radio transmission without collisions.
A grid network with random but permanent node failures
is considered in [4, 5]. Necessary and sufficient conditions
on the required transmission range r as a function of node
failure probability are derived. The problem of achieving
consensus in a wireless network is studied in [8].
In [13], Koo considers achieving reliable broadcast in
multi-hop radio networks in the presence of Byzantine
faults. It is shown that the task is impossible for t ≥
d 12r(2r + 1)e. Bhandari and Vaidya [2, 3] show thatd 12r(2r + 1)e is indeed an exact threshold of t, meaning
that the task is always achievable for t < 12r(2r + 1).
Bhandari and Vaidya also present the threshold of t for the
case of crash-stop failures. In [14], Koo. et al. addition-
ally allow a bad node to cause a (known) bounded num-
ber of collisions, while placing no bound on the number of
non-collision-causing messages that can be sent by a node.
They show that despite the additional power available to the
bad nodes, reliable broadcast remains solvable as long as
t < 12r(2r + 1).
Concurrent with Koo et al.’s work [14], Gilbert et
al. [10] consider a single-hop and collision-bounded model
in which a bad and a good node can send at most β and β′
messages, respectively. Moreover, β is assumed to be un-
known to good nodes in advance, and the source is assumed
to be good. Different from this paper, their goal is to char-
acterize the maximum ratio of disruption caused by the ad-
versary to the cost of causing that disruption, and how long
the adversary can delay the protocol without even perform-
ing a single broadcast. In [9], the authors place no restric-
tions on the adversary, which is allowed to disrupt commu-
nication and jam the airwaves in an arbitrary and unlimited
fashion. Instead, they assume that each of the devices has
access to multiple channels of communication. Based on
such a model, they present algorithms that achieve ²-gossip
and characterize their complexity.
1.2 Model and assumptions
The problem is to broadcast a message with value Vtrue
from a base station, or source node, at (0, 0) to all nodes in
the network. We consider a network model similar to those
described in [2–4, 13]. A total of n nodes are deployed on
a grid (each grid cell is a 1 × 1 square). All nodes have
an integer transmission radius r. A node’s neighborhood
is defined as the set of nodes within distance r of that node.
We only consider the L∞ metric, which means that a node’s
neighborhood is a square of side length 2r centered at itself.
When no collision occurs, a message broadcast by a node is
correctly received by all nodes within its neighborhood. To
avoid edge effect we assume that the network is toroidal,
and the network diameter D À r.
We adopt the locally-bounded adversarial model [13]
where any single neighborhood contains t < r(2r + 1) bad
nodes.1 The bad nodes can alter the message and try to trick
good nodes into accepting a wrong value. As in [2,3,13,14],
we assume there is a pre-determined time-slotted schedule
such that if all nodes follow the schedule then no collision
will occur. However, a bad node may deviate from this
schedule and cause message collisions. When two nodes
and perform a local broadcast at the same time, their com-
mon neighbor nodes can receive a wrong message, or no
message at all, without noticing anything abnormal. Let m
and mf be the message budget of a good and a bad node,
respectively. We treat the base station as a special node that
is not message-bounded.
Let A be a closed area on the plane, denote by (A) and
{A} the set of nodes in the interior and on the boundary
of A, respectively, and let [A] = (A) ∪ {A}. The set of
nodes in a rectangular area {(x, y) : x1 ≤ x ≤ x2 and y1 ≤
y ≤ y2} is denoted by [x1 . . . x2, y1 . . . y2]. When x1 =
1Notice this bound is higher than that of the message-unbounded
model [2,13]. This bound can be achieved when good nodes have a higher
message budget than bad ones.
3
x2, we will just write [x1, y1 . . . y2]; similarly, when y1 =
y2, we write [x1 . . . x2, y1]. A node is said to be decided
if it has committed to, or accepted, a value, and undecided
otherwise. A node set A is said to be decided if all the good
nodes in A have accepted a value. Let G(A) and B(A) be
the sets of good nodes and bad nodes of A, respectively.
As in [10, 12], we assume that the base station is always
correct (a compromised base station often means the whole
network becoming useless). With this assumption, a pro-
tocol is said to achieve broadcast in the network if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold: (1) Completeness: every good
node in the network eventually accepts some value, and (2)
Correctness: all good nodes accept Vtrue. Notice the dif-
ference from traditional definition of successful byzantine
fault-tolerant broadcast, which also considers the possibil-
ity of a faulty source. This case can actually be handled
separately by running a special protocol [14] for achieving
agreement first among the source’s neighborhood.
1.3 Contributions
Let m0 = d 2tmf+1r(2r+1)−te, where t < r(2r+1). This paper
makes contributions for three cases2:
1. (Known mf and homogeneous m, Sections 2,3) If
mf is known in advance and m is homogeneous
among all good nodes, then the task is shown to be im-
possible for anym < m0, while it is achievable ifm ≥
2m0. This result should be compared with the scheme
suggested in [14] which requiresm = 2tmf+1, which
is 12 [r(2r + 1) − t] times our budget. The key idea is
to consider a concerted action of nearby good nodes in
overcoming collisions, rather than isolated effort from
individual nodes.
2. (Known mf and heterogeneous m, Section 4) If
mf is known and m is allowed to be heterogeneous,
then the task is possible when only Θ(r3) good nodes
have m′ = 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e ≈ 2m0 and all other good
nodes have m = m0. When r ¿ n, which is com-
mon in practice, this may substantially reduce average
message cost as compared with the homogeneous case.
The improvement comes from a more careful analysis
of the propagation pattern of Vtrue.
3. (Unknown mf , Section 5) When mf is unknown,
then a coding scheme is proposed that helps verify the
integrity of message at the receiver without using any
cryptographic techniques. Borrowing ideas from All-
Unidirectional Error-Detecting coding schemes [6, 7],
this code leads to the design of a reliable reactive local
2The first two results are reported in a two-page brief announce-
ment [1].
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Figure 1: Impossibility of reliable broadcast.
broadcast primitive, which, combined with the multi-
hop protocol proposed in [3], achieves reliable broad-
cast for t < 12r(2r + 1) with high probability. This
provides a probabilistic solution to an open problem
suggested in [14].
2 A lower bound of m for reliable broadcast
In this section we show an impossibility result for reli-
able broadcast.
Theorem 1. If m < m0, then reliable broadcast is impos-
sible.
Proof. We let the adversary pick a stripe area of height r,
extending in the horizontal direction; see an illustration in
Figure 1. In this stripe area, for every interval of 2r + 1,
which defines a rectangle (see the gray area shown in Fig-
ure 1), the adversary chooses to corrupt t nodes, starting
from the top left node of the rectangle and in a left-to-right
and then top-to-bottom order. In the figure, the bad nodes
are shown in black while the good nodes are in white. We
claim that none of the good nodes above the stripe area will
be able to accept Vtrue.
We prove this by contradiction. Assume that u is the first
node above the stripe area that accepts Vtrue. Then it must
be able to make a majority decision from all the messages
it receives. It is easy to verify that if u’s neighborhood con-
tains any good node from the stripe area (which is the nec-
essary condition for u to ever receive a correct message),
then u’s neighborhood must cover exactly t bad nodes, and
have g ≤ r(2r + 1) − t good nodes in the stripe. In the
worst case, the t bad nodes can corrupt up to tmf messages
by causing collisions, each resulting in a wrong value be-
ing delivered to u. To outnumber the tmf wrong values, u
will have to receive at least tmf +1 correct messages. This
means that at least 2tmf + 1 correct messages have to be
sent from the g good nodes in u’s neighborhood. It follows
that every good node has to send at least d 2tmf+1r(2r+1)−te mes-
sages. Hence, it must be the case that m ≥ d 2tmf+1r(2r+1)−te,
which contradicts with the assumption m < m0.
4
p
r=4
corner node
Figure 2: Impossibility of reliable broadcast for m slightly
larger than m0. r = 4, t = 1,mf = 1000,m0 =
d 2tmf+1r(2r+1)−te = 58,m = m0 + 1 = 59.
Therefore, there cannot exist one node above the stripe
area that accepts Vtrue, meaning that the broadcast will fail.
Next, we show that m ≥ m0 does not guarantee reliable
broadcast in general. An example is shown in Figure 2, in
which r = 4, t = 1,mf = 1000,m0 = d 2tmf+1r(2r+1)−te =
58,m = m0 + 1 = 59. The bad nodes are distributed in
the network in such a way that every neighborhood has ex-
actly one bad node. First, the nodes in the neighborhood
of the source node will be able to receive sufficient correct
messages and accept Vtrue. Then, four additional nodes, in
gray and located outside the gray square, can each receive
(r(2r + 1) − t) · m = 2065 > 2000 + 1 = 2tmf + 1
messages, thus being able to accept Vtrue. After that, no
other good node will be able to receive enough correct mes-
sages that outnumber all possible wrong messages. Taking
the node p as an example, it has only 33 decided neighbors,
each being able to contribute 59 messages. Thus at most
1947 correct messages will be sent to p. The bad node in
p’s neighborhood, however, can alter up to 1000 messages
by causing collisions, leaving only 947 < 1000 copies of
correct messages delivered to P . Consequently, p will not
be able to tell the correct value from the messages received,
and so the broadcast fails.
Generally, in the propagation of Vtrue, the nodes near the
corners of the square area that has already accepted Vtrue
have the fewest neighbors that can feed them Vtrue, so are
the “weakest” under attack. Once we can solve this prob-
lem, the broadcast problem will be easy to solve.
3 Reliable broadcast for m ≥ 2m0
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If m ≥ 2m0, then reliable broadcast can be
achieved by some protocol.
This result should be compared with the scheme sug-
gested in [14] which requires every good node to have
m = 2tmf + 1 message budget, which is 12 [r(2r + 1)− t]
times our budget. The basic idea is to let nearby good nodes
cooperatively overcome collisions from relevant neighbor-
hoods, rather than letting every single node to counter all
possible interference from its own neighborhood. We first
describe a protocol B that uses the condition m ≥ 2m0, and
then prove that it guarantees reliable broadcast.
3.1 The protocol B
1. (Broadcast in the neighborhood of source): Ini-
tially, the source does a local broadcast of the message
2tmf +1 times. Each neighbor i of the source accepts
the majority value it receives from the source.
2. (Broadcast in the rest of the network): every non-
source node j, upon receiving a value, sends the ac-
cepted value 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e times. A node accepts a
value once it receives such a value at least tmf + 1
times.
3.2 Analysis
We show the correctness and completeness of B.
Lemma 1. (Correctness) No good node shall accept a
wrong value by following the protocol B.
Proof. If a good node accepts a wrong value v, then fol-
lowing the protocol it must have received v at least tmf +1
times. But it has at most t bad neighbors, each of which can
feed it a wrong value mf times, thus it cannot have received
more than tmf wrong values. This means that v must in-
deed be the correct value Vtrue.
The proof of completeness will use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define node sets A = [x . . . x+ r− 1, y . . . y−
r + 1], and B = [x . . . x + r, y . . . y − r + 1]. Assume
|G(A)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e, and |G(B)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e. Then,
(a) if A has accepted Vtrue, then the node set A′ = [x −
1 . . . x+ r, y + 1] will accept Vtrue;
(b) if B has accepted Vtrue, then the node set B′ =
[x . . . x+ r, y + 1] will accept Vtrue.
Proof. First, consider the node set A, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3(a). For an arbitrary node from A′, say P at (x −
1, y + 1), its neighborhood will cover A entirely. Since
|G(A)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e, and every good node in A will send
the message 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e times, the total number of mes-
sages delivered to P will be at least 2tmf + 1. These mes-
sages could be altered or dropped at most tmf times, result-
ing in at least tmf + 1 correct messages being delivered to
P . Taking a majority of all the received messages P will
accept the correct value. The same argument can be applied
to all other nodes in [x − 1 . . . x + r, y + 1]. Thus (a) is
proved. The case of B can be analyzed in a similar way,
which proves (b).
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Figure 3: Propagation of Vtrue from areas with sufficient
good nodes.
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Lemma 3. (Completeness) Every good node is eventually
able to accept Vtrue.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction.
Base Case: All good nodes in the neighborhood of the
source are able to accept Vtrue. This follows trivially since
the source broadcasts the correct message 2tmf + 1 times,
thus being able to deliver at least tmf +1 correct messages
to any node in its neighborhood.
Induction: We show that if the neighborhood of a node at
(a, b), [a−r . . . a+r, y−r . . . y+r], is able to accept Vtrue,
then all nodes adjacent to that neighborhood are able to ac-
cept Vtrue. Due to the symmetry of network, it suffices to
show that the set of nodes adjacent to one side of the neigh-
borhood, that is, [(a− r− 1) . . . (a+ r+1), y+ r+1], can
accept Vtrue.
Consider the four nodes sets, A = [a − r . . . a − 1, b +
1 . . . b + r], B = [a, b + 1 . . . b + r], C = [a + 1 . . . a +
r, b + 1 . . . b + r], and D = A ∪ B ∪ C = [a − r . . . a +
r, b + 1 . . . b + r], as illustrated in Figure 4. It can be seen
that
|G(A∪B∪C)| = |G(D)| = |D|− |B(D)| ≥ r(2r+1)− t.
(1)
Now consider two cases:
1. Both |G(A)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e and |G(C)| ≥
d r(2r+1)−t2 e. In this case, we apply Lemma 2(a) to A
and B to obtain that both [a−r−1 . . . a, y+r+1] (the
line with filled circles) and [a . . . a+ r+ 1, y + r+ 1]
(the line with crosses) by can accept Vtrue. Thus the
node set [(a − r − 1) . . . (a + r + 1), y + r + 1] can
accept Vtrue.
2. Either |G(A)| < d r(2r+1)−t2 e or |G(C)| <
d r(2r+1)−t2 e. Without loss of generality, assume that
|G(C)| < d r(2r+1)−t2 e. Then it must hold that |G(A ∪
B)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e, because otherwise |G(A ∪ B ∪
C)| = |G(A ∪ B)| + |G(C)| < r(2r + 1) − t, which
contradicts with Eqn.(1). LetE = A∪B, and applying
Lemma 2(b) to E, we know that [a− r . . . a, b+ r+1]
(see the line with filled circles) can accept Vtrue. Next,
consider the node set E′ = [a−r . . . a, b+2 . . . b+r+
1]which can be viewed by moving the setE upward by
one unit. Since bothE′ andC are contained by a single
neighborhood, and |E′|+|C| = |E|+|C| = r(2r+1),
it holds that |G(E′)| ≥ d r(2r+1)−t2 e, because other-
wise |G(E′)| + |G(C)| < r(2r + 1) − t, leading to
|B(E′)| + |B(C)| > t which contradicts with the as-
sumption that the number of bad nodes in a single
neighborhood should be no more than t. Applying
Lemma 2(b) to E′ gives that [a − r . . . a, b + r + 2]
can accept Vtrue. In a similar way, we can see that all
nodes in the set F = [a−r . . . a, b+r+1 . . . b+2r+1]
(whose nodes are marked by crosses) will be able
to accept Vtrue. Applying Lemma 2(b) to the set
[a − r . . . a − 1, b + r + 1 . . . b + 2r + 1] we ob-
tain that the set [a − r − 1, b + r + 1 . . . b + 2r + 1]
(the line with small squares) will be able to accept
Vtrue. Up to now, Vtrue has been accept by the
nodes in [a − r − 1 . . . a, b + r + 1]. Following the
same process as above, we can have all the nodes in
[a+1 . . . a+r+1, b+r+1 . . . b+2r+1] (whose nodes
are marked by circles) accept Vtrue. Now we have that
all the nodes in [(a− r− 1) . . . (a+ r+1), y+ r+1]
can accept Vtrue, which completes the inductive step.
Combining the base case and the induction proves the
lemma.
Lemmas 1 and 3 together thus prove Theorem 2.
The necessary and sufficient conditions given in Theo-
rem 1 and Theorem 2 for m can be stated in a more classic
way: what is the maximum t that can be tolerated in reliable
broadcast, given m and mf?
Corollary 1. Given m and mf , any t > mr(2r+1)−12mf+m can
cause broadcast to fail, while any t ≤ mr(2r+1)−24mf+m can be
tolerated by some broadcast protocol.
64 Reliable broadcast for heterogeneous m
In this section we show that if nodes are allowed to have
heterogeneous message budgets, then the average message
cost of good nodes can be substantially reduced. The ma-
licious behavior under consideration is the replacement of
good nodes with bad nodes by the adversary, subject to the
constraint of t and mf on bad nodes.
Theorem 3. If Θ(r3) good nodes have message bound
m′ = 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e (≤ 2m0) and the other good nodes
have m = m0, then reliable broadcast can be achieved by
some protocol.
The source of improvement over the homogeneous case
is a more careful analysis of the propagation pattern of Vtrue
in the network. In our proof of Theorem 2, and also in a se-
quence of previous papers [2, 13, 14], the inductive step re-
quires a Vtrue-covered square region to expand into a larger
square, so that the entire network can be eventually covered
by Vtrue. The main challenge here is for the corner nodes
(see Figure 2) near that region to accept Vtrue, since they
have the fewest good neighbors that can feed them Vtrue.
We have shown this to be the obstacle to reliable broadcast
when every node has only m = m0 , and have demon-
strated how this can be done with every good node having
m = 2m0. In this section we consider doing the task with
only a fraction of the good nodes having m = 2m0 while
others having m = m0.
Our new strategy is to use a circular, rather than a rect-
angular, area for the “growing body” of the Vtrue-covered
region in induction. This strategy in effect eliminates the
corner nodes problem: assume the circle is large enough,
then any undecided node v adjacent to it has approximately
a half neighborhood covered by the circle region, as com-
pared with only a quarter neighborhood coverage in the case
of a corner node near a square region. This significantly im-
proves v’s (worst-case) chance of accepting Vtrue because
it can find more good and decided neighbors that supply
Vtrue to them. On the other hand, this strategy requires
transition into a geometric context as circles are no longer
aligned with the integer nodes. We accomplish this by iden-
tifying a series of Vtrue propagation patterns.
We first describe a protocol Bheter that runs on a het-
erogeneous message budget configuration, as illustrated in
Figure 5. In the cross-shaped area, all good nodes have a
message budget of m′ = 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e ≈ 2m0, while all
other good nodes have message budget m0.
4.1 The protocol Bheter
1. (Broadcast in the neighborhood of source): Ini-
tially, the source does a local broadcast of the message
2tmf +1 times. Each neighbor i of the source accepts
the majority value it hears from the source.
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Figure 5: A message budget configuration which enables
reliable broadcast. In the gray cross area, all (good) nodes
have message budget 2tmf+1d(r(2r+1)−t)/2e (≤ 2m0), while all
other (good) nodes have message budget m0.
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tern, and frontier.
2. (Broadcast in the rest of the network): every non-
source node j, upon accepting a value, sends the ac-
cepted value m times (or m′ times if in the cross-
shaped area). A node accepts a value once it receives
that value tmf + 1 times.
4.2 Analysis
We first show a sufficient condition for Vtrue to propa-
gate to an undecided node.
Lemma 4. If a node p has r(2r+1) neighbors (either good
or bad) that have accepted Vtrue, then p is able to accept
Vtrue.
Proof. The node p has at least r(2r + 1) − t decided good
neighbors, and thus can receive at least m0(r(2r + 1) −
t) = 2tmf + 1 correct messages, meaning it can accept
Vtrue.
Next we describe a basic propagation pattern of Vtrue
in the network. First we introduce several concepts. De-
fine a committed line, denoted L(ρ, P0, Pl), l ≥ 1, where
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Figure 7: Shifted committed line, float committed line, and
frontiers.
ρ ∈ Z and −r ≤ ρ ≤ 0, as a line segment such that:
(1) its slope is ρ/r; (2) its left and right endpoints are
two integer nodes P0 = (x0, y0) and Pl = (xl, yl), re-
spectively; (3) it contains a sequence of intermediate nodes
Pi = (x0 + ir, y0 + iρ), 0 < i < l; (4) let the line con-
taining it be y = f(x), then the good nodes in the area
{(x, y) : x0 ≤ x ≤ xl and f(x)− 2r ≤ y ≤ f(x)}, called
the back area, have all accepted Vtrue. In Figure 6, the line
segment P0P4 is a committed line. The (shaded) back area
A is a parallelogram sharing one edge with P0P4 and hav-
ing a height of 2r.
A generalized form of a committed line is called a shifted
committed line, which is the same as the former except
that its two endpoints are not necessarily integer nodes
and whose back area is defined as {(x, y) : x0 ≤ x ≤
xl and bf(x)c − 2r ≤ y ≤ f(x)}. A further generaliza-
tion is the float committed line, which does not necessarily
contain the sequence of integer nodes Pi = (x0 + ir, y0 +
iρ), 0 ≤ i ≤ l. In Figure 6, if P0P4 is moved along the line
containing it so that either P0 or P4 becomes a non-integer
node, then P0P4 becomes a shifted committed line; further-
more, if P0P4 (together with its back area) is moved to an
arbitrary position in the plane, then P0P4 becomes a float
committed line.
The basic Vtrue propagation pattern is as follows.
Lemma 5. (Basic Vtrue propagation pattern) Given
a committed line L(ρ, P0, Pl), l > 3, moving the line
P1Pl−1 upward by one unit yields a new committed line
L(ρ, P ′1, P ′l−1).
In the following, we derive several variants of this prop-
agation pattern that are increasingly easier to utilize in a
continuous domain. Due to space reasons, the proofs are
omitted here.
Let L(ρ, P0, Pl), l > 3 be a committed line. Draw a line
with slope (ρ+1)/r from P1, and a line with slope (ρ−1)/r
from Pl−l, which intersect at v0, called L’s frontier. Recall
that [A] represents the node set in the interior and on the
boundary of the closed area A.
Lemma 6. (Committed line propagation pattern) Given
a committed line L(ρ, P0, Pl), l > 3 with frontier v0,
then [4P1Pl−1v0] will accept Vtrue. Moreover, |P1v0| ≥
(b|L|/2√2rc − 1)r and |Pl−1v0| ≥ (b|L|/2
√
2rc − 1)r.
Let EE′ be a shifted committed line (Figure 7(a)) with
slope ρ and whose length is larger than 4
√
ρ2 + r2. Let u0
and u1 be two points on EE′ such that |Eu0| = |E′u1| =
2
√
r2 + ρ2. Draw a line with slope (ρ+1)/r from u0, and
a line with slope (ρ − 1)/r from u1, which intersect at v1,
called EE′’s frontier.
Lemma 7. (Shifted committed line propagation pattern)
Given a committed line L(ρ, P0, Pl), l > 3 with u0, u1,
v1 as specified above, then [4u0u1v1] will accept Vtrue.
Moreover, |u0v1| ≥ (b|EE′|/2
√
2rc − 2)r and |u1v1| ≥
(b|EE′|/2√2rc − 2)r.
Let EE′ be a float committed line (Figure 7(b)) with
slope ρ and whose length is larger than 6
√
ρ2 + r2. Let w0
and w1 be two points on EE′ such that |Ew0| = |E′w1| =
3
√
r2 + ρ2. Draw a line with slope (−ρ + 1)/r from w0,
and a line with slope (−ρ − 1)/r from w1, which intersect
at v2, called EE′’s frontier.
Lemma 8. (Float committed line propagation pattern)
Given a float committed line L(ρ, P0, Pl), l > 3 with w0,
w1, v2 as specified above, then [4w0w1v2] will accept
Vtrue. Moreover, |w0v2| ≥ (b|EE′|/2
√
2rc − 3)r and
|w1v2| ≥ (b|EE′|/2
√
2rc − 3)r.
Define an expanding line as a line segment with a slope
h ∈ (−1, 0). Assume ρ/r ≤ h < (ρ + 1)/r, where ρ ∈ Z
and −r < ρ < 0. Figure 8(a) shows an example in which
the expanding line EE′ lies between two float committed
lines: EE1 with slope ρ/r, and EF with slope (ρ+ 1)/r.
Lemma 9. Assume an expanding line EE′ sufficiently long
and with a slope ρ/r ≤ h < (ρ + 1)/r, where ρ ∈ Z and
−r < ρ < 0. Draw a line segment EE1 of length 37r with
slope ρ/r, and a line segment E′E′1 of length 37r from E′
with slope (ρ + 1)/r, both beneath EE′. Then either EE1
or E′E′1’s frontier is above EE′, with a distance to EE′
(i.e., distance to its projection on EE′) d > 1.25.
Proof. (Sketch) Let ∠1 = ∠E1EE′,∠2 = E′EF,∠3 =
E1EF and ∠4 = ∠E′1E′E, as depicted in Figure 8(a).
Since ∠4 = ∠2, it must hold that either ∠1 ≤ 12∠3 or
∠4 ≤ 12∠3. Due to the symmetry we only need consider
the first case.
By Lemma 8, |w0v2| ≥ (b37r/2
√
2rc − 3)r > 10r. As
assumed, ∠1 ≤ 12∠3, thus ∠w0w2E = ∠2 ≥ 12∠3 = ∠1.
It follows that |w0w2| < |w0E| = 3
√
ρ2 + r2 < 3
√
2r.
Therefore, |w2v2| > 10r − 3
√
2r > 5r.
Since d = |w2v2| sin∠2′ = 7r sin∠2 ≥ 7r sin 12∠3,
we need to obtain a lower bound of 12∠3 in order to bound
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d from below. Figure 8(b) shows possible committed lines
EF0, EF1, · · · , EFr, whose slopes are 0,−1/r, · · · ,−1,
respectively. It is easy to verify that the minimum ∠3 cor-
responds to the angle ∠FrEFr−1. Let V be the projection
of Fr−1 on EFr. It is the case that |Fr−1V | =
√
2/2, so
sin∠3 = |Fr−1V |/|EFr−1| =
√
2/2|EFr−1| ≥ 1/2r. It
follows that cos∠3 ≤ √4r2 − 1/2r. Hence, sin 12∠3 =√
1−cos∠3
2 ≥ 14r , and d > 5/4 = 1.25.
Lemma 9 is used to prove the following result.
Lemma 10. Let C be the circle of radius R ≥ 550r2 cen-
tered at the source node (0, 0). If [C] has accepted Vtrue,
then there exists some δ > 0 such that [C ′], where C ′ is
a circle of radius R + δ centered at the source node, will
accept Vtrue.
Proof. Assume an expanding line EE′ of length 74r whose
end points are both on the circle C (see Figure 8(d)). Draw
a ray from (0, 0) that is perpendicular toEE′, and intersects
with EE′ and C at H and H1, respectively. By Lemma 9,
the float committed lineEE1 of length 37r right belowEE′
has a frontier point above EE′. Now move EE1, together
with its frontier v2, along EE′ until E reaches H , then the
trajectory of v2 will form a line segment v2v′2. Assume that
the ray OH intersects with v2v′2 at H2. By Lemma 8, all
nodes, if there are any, on the line segments HH2 are de-
cided.
Let L = |EE′|. It can be verified that |HH1| = R −√
R2 − |EE′|2/4 < 0.72 < 1.25 < |HH2|, which means
that H2 is outside C. Let δ = 1.25 − |HH1| > 0.53.
Now move the expanding line EE′ along the circle C, with
EE′’s endpoints remaining in touch with C, and subject
to the slope constraint of an expanding line. During this
process, |HH1| will remain the same, so H1H2 will remain
no less than δ. The trajectory of H1H2 therefore will sweep
over a belt area in which all nodes will be decided, as shown
as a shaded region in Figure 8(d). Note this belt region does
not include the boundary line segment PP ′, where P (resp.
P ′) is the intersection point between the line y = x(x > 0)
and C (resp. C ′). By Lemma 7, it is easy to see that all
nodes, if there are any, on PP ′ are decided. Similarly, QQ′,
where Q (resp. Q′) is the intersection point between the
line (x = 0, y > 0) and C (resp. C ′), will be decided.
By symmetry, the nodes in the ring of width δ outside and
adjacent to C will be able to accept Vtrue , which means
that all nodes in [C ′] will accept Vtrue.
Lemma 11. If all nodes in the cross-shaped area shown
in Figure 5 have accepted Vtrue, then [C], where C is the
circle of radius R = 550r2 centered at the source node, will
accept Vtrue.
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Figure 8: Expanding line and message propagation.
Proof. Following the same argument as for Lemma 3, we
know that all the nodes in the cross area will accept Vtrue.
Consider a committed line E1E′1, as illustrated in Figure 5.
By Lemma 5, E1E′1 will yield a new committed line FF ′,
where F and F ′ are two nodes at the edge of the cross area.
Since FF ′ extends into the cross area, the extended line
segment E2E′2, where E2 is a node on the y-axis and one
unit above E1, and E′2 is a node on the x-axis and one unit
right after E′1, is a committed line. By induction and sym-
metry, all the nodes in the square of side length ≥ 778r2
will accept Vtrue. Thus all nodes within the circle of ra-
dius R = 550r2 centered at the source node will accept
Vtrue.
With the above message budget configuration, Vtrue is
guaranteed to “fill” the cross-shaped area, and so the rest of
the network can accept Vtrue. Theorem 3 then follows from
Lemmas 11 and 10, with similar correctness and complete-
ness arguments to those of Theorem 2.
5 Reliable broadcast when mf is unknown
In this section we consider reliable broadcast whenmf is
unknown. Different from some previous work (e.g., [8,10])
in which some form of collision detector is required, we do
not assume collision detection capability of the nodes. As
a result, a receiving node cannot distinguish between a col-
lision and the absence of transmission. In other words, the
adversary has the ability to “cancel out” a message trans-
mission (by, for example, predicting the shape of signal and
sending an inverted signal [7]), without being noticed by
the receiver. This generalization makes reliable broadcast
more difficult because it is not obvious how transmission
feedback can be exploited. The first challenge we face is
therefore to make local broadcast reliable.
We provide a probabilistic solution to this first problem.
We say that the broadcast is successful with a high probabil-
ity if it succeeds with probability at least 1− n−1, where n
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is the network size. Assume that the broadcast message has
k bits, 〈b0b1, . . . , bk−1〉. The good nodes know a very loose
upper bound mmax for the bad nodes’ budget. This bound
may be an estimate of a practical device’s energy limit, and
may well be orders of magnitude higher than the real mf .
This bound is so loose that using the previous protocols with
this knowledge is practically meaningless.
At the heart of our protocol is an encoding/decoding
scheme that can detect errors when the message has been
altered by the adversary through collisions. The idea is bor-
rowed from All-Unidirectional Error-Detecting codes [6,7]
which are used in situations where it is possible to flip, for
example, a bit from “0” to “1” but not vice-versa (except
with a negligible probability). With such a code, the re-
ceiver is able to detect any number of bit-flipping errors.
The encoding is performed at two levels: bit-level and
sub-bit-level (see Figure 9). A message is encoded into a
sequence of bits, and each bit into a sequence of L sub-bits.
As the basic transmission unit, a sub-bit has two states, u
and −, which represent the presence and absence of a sig-
nal (or a strong and weak signal) for a duration of a time
slot, respectively. In the code, every bit 0 is represented by
a sequence of −’s, while every 1 by a sequence of random
sub-bits. At the receiver side, any such sequence contain-
ing at least one u will be interpreted as a 1. This mech-
anism has the following consequence: the adversary can
easily flip a 0 bit to 1, by inserting a u in the sub-bit se-
quence of 0, but has some difficulty to turn a 1 into a 0,
because to do so it has to know exactly which sub-bits are
u’s and which are −’s. Taking one u for − will leave one
u intact in the sequence, while taking one − for u will
lead to a transmission of signal that has nothing to cancel
out, thereby generating a new u sub-bit. Either will lead to
the receiver decoding the sequence into a 1, which is cor-
rect. Due to the randomness of sub-bit generation for 1,
guessing the whole sequence correctly will be increasingly
difficult when the sequence length grows. In our design,
L = 2 log n + log t + logmmax, which makes the attack
success probability be pbiterr = 2−L = 1n2tmmax .
At the bit-level, the coded message consists of the orig-
inal message, denoted by S0, with the appendix of a se-
ries of segments S1, S2, . . . , Sl. The lengths of these seg-
ments are k0 = k, k1, . . . , kl, respectively, and satisfy
ki = blog ki−1c+1. The segment Si holds the number of 1
bits in the preceding segment Si−1. The last two segments
Sl−1 and Sl each has two bits. It is easy to see that the last
segment Sl can only be 01 or 10. At the receiver side, a
node can verify the integrity of a message by checking the
number of 1’s in each segment. Since the adversary is only
able to change 0 to 1 (except with a very small probability),
and to maintain the consistency of bit 1 counting across the
segments, any such changes will result in further changes,
from the segment where the first changes take place through
all segments until Sl. For Sl, the only change the adversary
can possibly make is to turn one 0 into 1, resulting in the
code 11. However, this code cannot happen in a correct
code because the segment Sl−1 can have at most two 1 bits.
Therefore, once a message has been tampered with, the re-
ceiver will be able to detect an error almost surely, with a
probability at least 1− pbiterr.
Let K =
∑l
i=0 ki be the coded message length for
an original message of k bits, then transmitting a message
takes K · L consecutive time slots. We define such a se-
quence of time slots as a message round. With the er-
ror detecting code, it is possible to realize a reliable local
broadcast primitive with probabilistic guarantees. The lo-
cal broadcast uses a negative acknowledge (NACK) mes-
sage, which has the same length as a normal message, but
with different content that is understood by the protocol.
When a receiver detects an error in the message, it broad-
casts an NACK message to its neighborhood. The receipt
of an NACK message, either correct or corrupt, indicates a
transmission failure. Upon detecting a failure, the sender
re-transmits the message. A node repeats transmitting a
message until it receives no NACK messages in subsequent
consecutive (2r + 1)2 − 1 message rounds. In the worst
case, a node needs to transmit a message tmf times to de-
liver Vtrue to all its neighbors, with a probability at least
1− t ·mmax · pbiterr = 1− n−2.
Having made local broadcast reliable, we can now run
the protocol proposed in [3] on top of our reactive local pro-
tocol to achieve reliable multi-hop broadcast. This protocol
can tolerate up to 12r(2r + 1) − 1 bad nodes per neighbor-
hood. We call the combined protocol Breactive. Regarding
the message overhead of good nodes, we have the following
result.
Theorem 4. In the protocol Breactive, any good node needs
to transmit no more than
m = 2(tmf+1)(2 log n+log t+logmmax)(k+2 log k+2)
times, where t < 12r(2r + 1), to achieve reliable broadcast
with a probability at least 1− n−1.
Proof. At the message level, a node needs at most tmf + 1
transmissions to make sure that every neighbor receive an
10integral message with probability at least 1−n−2. Before it
receives the message, it may need to transmit up to tmf +1
negative acknowledge messages. So a node may transmit
2(tmf+1) times in the worse case. Every message involves
KL sub-bits, each of which may need one transmission.
Observe that K = k+blog kc+1+blog(blog kc+1)c+1+
· · · ≤ k+2 log k+2.Hence in total a node needs to transmit
at most m = 2(tmf + 1)(2 log n+ log t+ logmmax)(k +
2 log k + 2) to ensure reliable broadcast with probability at
least 1 − n−2. Considering the network diameter D < n,
the whole network broadcast will succeed with probability
at least 1− n−1.
Comparing Theorem 4 with the results in previous sec-
tions, one can see that when mf is unknown, good nodes
need a much higher message budget to achieve reliable
broadcast than when mf is known. This is to be expected
since without the knowledge of the adversary’s capability,
one has to make the worse case estimate when dealing with
attacks.
In comparison with the I-code proposed in [7], our
scheme has a lower coding overhead, since for a mes-
sage of length k, our scheme generates a code of length
k + O(log k), whereas I-code yields a length 2k. On the
other hand, our scheme has a higher per-attack penalty since
the integrity verification is on a message basis, which means
that every bit flipping attack from the adversary causes the
whole message to be re-transmitted, while the I-code ver-
ifies message bit by bit, meaning that only the flipped bit
needs to be re-transmitted. Final comparison on message ef-
ficiency thus calls for a refined model that takes into account
message length and per-message attack rate. This might be
a subject of future study.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the problem of reliable broadcast tol-
erating Byzantine faults in a message-bounded radio net-
work. Given the communication range, the message bounds
of nodes, and the maximum number of faulty nodes per
neighborhood, we show how large m should be in order for
broadcast to be reliable.
For the homogeneous case of m, the presented results
leave an uncertain region of m ∈ (m0, 2m0) for which it is
unclear whether the broadcast task is possible. It is there-
fore of interest to investigate tighter bounds for this prob-
lem. Allowing probabilistic placement of bad nodes in the
network as in [4] may be another topic of future research.
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